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Abstract: What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to 
be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a 
morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others 
argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that 
make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something 
important in common. They focus almost exclusively on the moral worth of right actions. 
But there is a negatively valenced counterpart that attaches to wrong actions, which we will 
call moral counterworth. In this paper, we explore the moral counterworth of wrong actions 
in order to shed new light on the nature of moral worth. Contrary to theorists in both camps, 
we argue that more than one kind of motivation can affect the moral worth of actions.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Doing the right thing can be difficult. Doing the morally worthy thing can be even harder. What 
it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for an action to have moral worth, 
is the subject of continued controversy. Historically, two positions on moral worth have taken 
centre stage. According to one camp, an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they 
do it because the action is morally right (Herman 1981; Jeske 1998; Sliwa 2016). According to the 
other camp, a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make 
the action right (Arpaly 2003; Arpaly & Schroeder 2014; Markovits 2010).1 These two views go by 
different names in the literature. The former view has been called the Kantian View (Johnson King 
2020; Isserow 2019), the Conservative View (Howard 2021), and the Rightness Itself View (Singh 
2020). The latter view has been called the New View (Johnson King 2020), the Right-Making 
Features View (Singh 2020), and the Responding View (Isserow 2019).  
 
1 Recently, some have offered views that cut across these two camps, like Isserow’s accounts of non-accidentality and 
moral worth (2019; 2020), Singh’s Guise of Moral Reasons Account (2020), and Douglas Portmore’s Concerns View 
(forthcoming). We discuss these views in more detail in §6.  
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 What sets these views apart is the kind of motivation each takes to be essential for an 
action’s moral worth. When an agent does the right thing because of the action’s moral rightness, 
she is motivated by rightness itself to perform that action. When an agent does the right thing because 
of a particular aspect of the action that makes it right, she is motivated by a right-making feature to 
perform that action. We refer to motivations from rightness itself as higher-order motivations and 
motivations from right-making features as first-order motivations, as right-making features are ground-
level facts that make an action right, and rightness itself is a fact that rests on those ground-level 
facts.2  Higher-order theorists, like Paulina Sliwa (2016) and Zoë Johnson King (2020), argue that 
higher-order motivations are necessary and sufficient for moral worth, while first-order 
motivations are largely irrelevant. By contrast, first-order theorists, like Nomy Arpaly (2003) and 
Julia Markovits (2010), argue that first-order motivations are necessary and sufficient for moral 
worth, while higher-order motivations are irrelevant. In an important sense, higher-order and first-
order views of moral worth are diametrically opposed to one another. The motivations that one 
camp argues are necessary and sufficient for moral worth are the very motivations that the other 
camp argues are irrelevant.  Nevertheless, proponents of these opposing views share something 
 
2 Often, these motivations are distinguished using the de re/de dicto distinction: To be motivated by an action’s 
rightness itself is to be motivated by rightness de dicto, and to be motivated by an action’s right-making features is to 
be motivated by rightness de re (Smith 1994; Weatherson 2019; Johnson King 2020). However, this way of discussing 
motivations has recently been criticized for failing to track what’s at stake in the debate (Singh 2020). We agree that 
there is need for a clearer way to refer to the two kinds of motivations, and opt for a first-order/higher-order 
distinction. This has the benefit of being valence-neutral, and is also used in other philosophical debates. For example, 
the literature on disagreement features a distinction between first-order evidence, evidence concerning p, and higher-
order evidence, evidence concerning the rationality of believing p (Christensen 2010; Kelly 2010). Importantly, the 
first-order/higher-order distinction is different from the Kantian distinction between primary and secondary motives, 
which regards an agent’s foreground and background motivations (Baron 1995; Herman 1996; Isserow 2021), and 
also different from the distinction between first-order and second-order desires, which regards an agent’s desire to X 
and their desire concerning their desire (Frankfurt 1971).  
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important in common. With the exception of Arpaly (2003) and Arpaly & Schroeder (2014), they 
theorise about the nature of moral worth by focusing almost exclusively on the moral worth of, 
and praiseworthiness or creditworthiness for, right actions. But each of these properties has a 
negatively valenced counterpart that attaches to wrong actions. Just as agents can deserve praise or 
credit for doing the right thing, they can deserve blame or discredit for doing the wrong thing. 
While the former actions have moral worth, the latter actions have what we will call moral 
counterworth. Given this apparent symmetry, examining the moral counterworth of actions could 
shed light on the nature of moral worth.  
 We proceed as follows. In §2 we present two approaches to theorising about moral worth 
and reflect on the considerations in favour of each. In §3 we present cases that indicate that both 
higher-order and first-order motivations contribute to the moral counterworth of wrong actions. 
We then argue that, given the relevant similarities between moral worth and moral counterworth, 
these considerations undermine both higher-order and first-order views, and instead support Dual 
Pertinence: First-order motivations and higher-order motivations can each affect the moral worth 
of an agent’s action. In §4 and §5 we demonstrate the resilience of this view. First, we argue that 
higher-order and first-order theorists cannot easily explain away the results of our cases because, 
surprisingly, there are reasons internal to both positions that support Dual Pertinence. 
Consequently, higher-order and first-order theories have much more in common with one another 
than previously thought. Next, we defend the claim that reflecting on moral counterworth can 
shed light on the nature of moral worth. We do so by showing that there is a strong prima facie 
case for there being symmetry between the two, and that neither theoretical nor empirical work 
on the differences between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness undermines this claim. Lastly, 
in §6, we conclude by explaining how reflection on moral counterworth can serve to support 
recently developed accounts of moral worth that make room for the relevance of both higher-
order and first-order motivations.  
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2. Two Approaches to Moral Worth 
Accounts of moral worth aim to determine the kinds of motivations that elevate merely right 
actions—actions that happen to conform to the correct normative theory—to morally worthy 
actions—actions that merit praise or credit.3 Of course, Morally worthy actions aren’t simply those 
that elicit praise from others. Rather, agents perform morally worthy actions when they are 
praiseworthy for doing the right thing. And this, according to moral worth theorists, depends on 
agents’ motives for action.  On one approach, morally worthy actions are those that are performed 
because they are morally right. On another, morally worthy actions are those that are performed 
for the reasons that make them morally right. In this section, we first present each approach and 
highlight the features that set them apart. Then, we turn our attention to what these approaches 
have in common.     
 
2a. Higher-order views  
Several philosophers take higher-order motivations to be critical for morally worthy actions. 
Perhaps the most notable defender of a higher-order view is Kant, who argues that morally worthy 
actions must be performed “for the sake of the law” (G 4: 390) and “simply from duty” (4: 398). 
More recent defenders of higher-order views include Sliwa and Johnson King:   
 
Sliwa: A morally right action has moral worth if and only if it is motivated by 
concern for doing what’s right (conative requirement) and by knowledge that it is 
the right thing to do (knowledge requirement). (2016: 394) 
 
 
3 While we largely write in terms of praiseworthiness in this paper, we intend to remain neutral between those who 
think moral worth is best conceived of in terms of creditworthiness (e.g., Portmore forthcoming; Singh 2020) and 
those who analyse moral worth in terms of praiseworthiness (e.g., Arpaly 2003; Johnson King 2020; Markovits 2010).    
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Johnson King: An act has moral worth just in case it is an instance of someone’s 
deliberately doing the right thing. (2020: 201)4  
 
There are subtle but important differences between these views. For example, while Sliwa argues 
that one must know that one is doing the right thing in order for one’s action to have moral worth, 
Johnson King argues that one simply needs to deliberately do the right thing, which does not 
require knowledge that what one is doing is right. For Johnson King, an agent deliberately does 
the right thing so long as they try to perform the action that they believe has the property of being 
morally right, even if they don’t know that the action possesses this property (2020: 203). 
Nevertheless, these authors follow the Kantian tradition by arguing that a higher-order motivation 
to do the right thing is necessary, and, when paired with the relevant beliefs or knowledge, 
sufficient for moral worth.  
 One key impetus for higher-order theories comes from considerations of accidentality. An 
assumption shared by most everyone in the moral worth debate is that accidents are not morally 
worthy. Imagine a professor who gives her students generous extensions on assignments during a 
global pandemic, not because it is the right thing to do, but because she wants to receive positive 
student evaluations at the end of the term. Most would agree that the professor’s action does not 
possess moral worth. Though the professor does the right thing by giving her students extensions, 
she does the right thing by accident. Her selfish motivations would have led her to do the wrong 
thing (inflate grades, cancel class frequently, etc.) in a wide range of circumstances, and it just so 
happens that in this case her selfish motivations result in doing the right thing. However, if the 
 
4 Mason (2019) defends a view of praiseworthiness that is similar to Johnson King’s view of moral worth. On Mason’s 
view, agents are morally praiseworthy when they try to do well by the correct normative theory (2019: 75). However, 
Mason is not concerned with moral worth. And while theorists of moral worth typically distinguish between right 
actions (those that are required by the correct normative theory) and morally worthy actions (those that merit praise), 
Mason does not operate with such a distinction and takes rightness to correlate with praiseworthiness.  
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professor gives her students generous extensions during a global pandemic because she is 
motivated to do what’s right, and she knows that providing extensions is the right thing to do (or 
she deliberately tries to do the right thing by giving her students extensions), then there is no sense 
in which the professor does the right thing by accident. In this case, the professor is moved by a 
higher-order motivation to do what’s right, and this guarantees that the rightness of her action is 
not accidental.5 Thus, higher-order theorists argue that acting on a higher-order motivation to do 
the right thing, when paired with the relevant beliefs or knowledge, is sufficient for performing a 
right action with moral worth.   
 Higher-order theorists also take higher-order motivations to be necessary for performing 
morally worthy actions. Imagine a professor who gives her students generous extensions on 
assignments during a global pandemic because she cares about their well-being, and despite not 
knowing that her action is morally right. In fact, she may think that her action is morally wrong—
perhaps because it violates certain university policies, which the professor (mistakenly) believes 
she ought never violate. Here too the professor’s motivations would have led her to do the wrong 
thing in a wide range of circumstances. As Barbara Herman (1981) argues, even caring for 
someone’s well-being can lead us to act wrongly, like when lending a helping hand to an art thief 
carrying a heavy painting. So, in this case, Sliwa and Johnson King would argue that the professor’s 
action does not possess moral worth. Since the professor does not think she is doing the right 
thing in offering extensions to her students, she is not motivated to perform this action because it 
is right. And, according to higher-order theorists, this renders her right action an accident, and one 
that cannot possess moral worth.  
 In arguing that higher-order motivations are necessary and sufficient for moral worth, 
higher-order theorists take first-order motivations—i.e., motivations from the reasons that make 
an action right—to be largely irrelevant to moral worth. Since they consider higher-order 
 
5 See Singh (2020) for criticism of this claim.  
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motivations sufficient for moral worth, first-order motivations cannot be necessary. The professor 
who gives her students extensions because it is the right thing to do need not also be motivated to 
perform the action because it promotes her students’ well-being for her action to be praiseworthy.6 
And, if higher-order motivations are necessary for moral worth, first-order motivations cannot be 
sufficient. The professor who thinks that it is wrong to give students extensions, but does so 
because she wishes to promote their well-being, does not perform a morally worthy action despite 
acting from the right first-order motivations.  
In addition to arguing that first-order motivations are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
moral worth, many higher-order theorists go further and argue that first-order motivations can 
have no impact at all on the moral worth of actions. While they grant that being concerned with 
the right-making features of actions can be praiseworthy in some sense, they deny that acting from 
these motivations impacts the degree to which agents are praiseworthy for performing right 
actions.  Johnson King argues:  
 
It is true that an agent who acts rightly and has stronger moral concern will be 
more praiseworthy overall than one who acts rightly but has weaker moral concern 
(under otherwise identical circumstances). But the first agent is not more 
praiseworthy for acting rightly than the other. She is more praiseworthy for her 




6 It’s possible that the professor has to rationally believe or know that giving her students extensions will promote their 
well-being in order to have the right kind of higher-order motivation for her action to possess moral worth. Higher-
order theorists typically do not take a mere belief that one is doing the right thing to be the kind of motivation 
sufficient for moral worth. Sliwa (2016), for example, argues that one must be motivated by the knowledge that one 
is doing the right thing, which could require that one also believe or know that one’s actions have the relevant right-
making features. Importantly, however, the higher-order theorist argues that one need not be motivated by these first-
order beliefs in order for one’s action to possess moral worth.  
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So, while first-order motivations may be relevant to agents’ characters, which can themselves be 
praiseworthy, first-order motivations do not affect the degree to which agents are praiseworthy 
for acting rightly. Thus, on higher-order views, first-order motivations play no direct role in 
determining the moral worth of right actions.7  
 
2b. First-order views  
In contrast, some philosophers take first-order motivations to be essential to morally worthy 
actions. Two notable philosophers who defend first-order views of moral worth are Arpaly and 
Markovits:  
 
Arpaly: For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for 
her to have done the right thing for the relevant reasons—that is, in response to 
the features that make it right… (2003: 72).  
 
Markovits: My action is morally worthy if and only if my motivating reasons for acting coincide 
with the reasons morally justifying the action—that is, if and only if I perform the action 
I morally ought to perform, for the (normative) reasons why it morally ought to 
be performed. (2010: 205)  
 
Like Sliwa’s and Johnson King’s views, there are interesting differences that set these accounts 
apart. However, these views are alike in that they take first-order motivations to be necessary and 
sufficient for morally worthy actions.   
 
7 This isn’t to say that first-order motivations couldn’t play an indirect or causal role in an agent’s coming to have the 
higher-order motivations needed for moral worth. An agent who has a first-order motivation to tell the truth because 
she cares about honesty, and also believes that telling the truth is the right thing to do because it is honest, could come 
to develop the higher-order motivation to tell the truth because it is the right thing to do. However, such a first-order 
motivation is neither necessary nor sufficient for developing the higher-order motivation. 
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 First-order theorists tend to rely on what Arpaly calls cases of “inadvertent virtue” (2003: 
10) to defend the sufficiency claim. These are cases in which individuals perform a morally right 
act because of its right-making features, but do not take themselves to be doing the right thing 
(and even take themselves to be doing the wrong thing). Take the professor who offers extensions 
to her students because she cares about their well-being, but believes that what she is doing is 
morally wrong. In stark contrast with higher-order theorists, first-order theorists would argue that 
the professor’s action possesses moral worth and she is praiseworthy for performing it. According 
to first-order theorists, performing the right action for the reasons that make it right ensures that 
the action is not an accident. As Markovits argues, “Actions motivated by right-making reasons… 
are not merely contingently or accidentally right. If I am motivated by right-making reasons, it is 
no coincidence that my motive issues in the right action” (2010: 211). In arguing that first-order 
motivations are sufficient for right actions to possess moral worth, first-order theorists reject the 
claim that higher-order motivations are necessary. The professor who takes herself to be doing the 
wrong thing by giving her students extensions during a pandemic is certainly not acting on a 
higher-order motivation to do the right thing. Nevertheless, first-order theorists like Arpaly and 
Markovits argue that such a right action is non-accidental and has moral worth.  
 First-order theorists also take first-order motivations to be necessary for moral worth. In 
doing so, they deny that higher-order motivations can be sufficient. Several first-order theorists 
follow in the footsteps of Michael Smith and argue that being motivated to perform the right 
action purely because it is the right thing to do reveals something defective about one’s moral 
character: 
 
Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their 
children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they 
deserve, justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe 
to be right, where this is read de dicto and not de re. Indeed, commonsense tells us 
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that being so motivated is a fetish or moral vice, not the one and only moral virtue. 
(1994: 75) 
 
Brian Weatherson, a sympathiser with first-order views, distils the following claim from this 
passage: “The good, as such, should not be one’s only motivation” (2019: 46). Not only do first-
order theorists take higher-motivations to be insufficient for moral worth, they take acting solely 
from these motivations to be morally criticisable.  
 In addition to arguing that higher-order motivations are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for moral worth, first-order theorists argue that they are inert when it comes to the moral worth 
of actions. This is because first-order theorists typically take the degree of moral worth to be 
determined exclusively by first-order motivations. Arpaly, for example, argues:  
 
…an agent is more praiseworthy, other things being equal, the stronger the moral 
concern that has led to her action… Moral concern is to be understood as concern 
for what is in fact morally relevant and not as concern for what the agent takes to 
be morality. (2003: 84) 
 
Arpaly takes moral worth to be determined by agents’ concern for the right-making features of 
actions and not their concern for morality as such. In this way, Arpaly explicitly rules out the 
relevance of higher-order motivations to the moral worth of actions. Markovits also proposes an 
account of moral worth that comes in degrees, when arguing that “…right actions have moral 
worth to the degree that the noninstrumental motivations for their performance coincide with 
noninstrumental moral justifications for their performance” (2010: 238). Because the fact that an 
action is morally right is not a right-making feature of the action, acting on such a reason will not 
coincide with the moral justifications for the performance of the act. So, higher-order motivations 
are rendered irrelevant on Markovits’s account too.  
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 In sum, first-order theorists take higher-order motivations to be irrelevant to moral 
worth—such motivations are neither necessary nor sufficient for moral worth, and they do not 
contribute to moral worth even in conjunction with first-order motivations.   
2c. Common ground  
Higher-order and first-order views of moral worth are very much at odds with one another. The 
motivations that higher-order views argue are necessary and sufficient for moral worth are the very 
motivations that first-order views argue are irrelevant, and vice versa. Given this sharp divide, it is 
perhaps no surprise that the proponents of these views have reached a dialectical impasse. Higher-
order theorists are unmoved by the cases that first-order theorists rely on to support their views, 
just as first-order theorists are unmoved by higher-order theorists’ supporting cases. 
 Nevertheless, these different approaches to understanding the nature of moral worth have 
something important in common. The discussion from both camps has focused almost exclusively 
on right actions. A cursory examination of the literature reveals a multitude of examples, such as 
showing up to teach a valuable class (Henson 1979: 43), selling goods at a fair price (Herman 1981: 
368), keeping a promise (Johnson King 2020: 190), saving drowning strangers (Markovits 2010: 
210), treating a snake bite and telling a hard truth (Singh 2020: 162-163), giving a friend a ride to 
work and giving money to charity (Sliwa 2016: 401-402), helping an enslaved individual seek 
freedom (just about everyone) and more. This attention to praiseworthy actions is likely due to the 
fact that Kant introduced the term ‘moral worth,’ or “moralischen Werth,” in a discussion of the 
morally good:  
 
 
In the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it [i.e. the action] 
conform with the moral law but it must also be done for the sake of the law; 
without this that conformity is only very contingent and precarious, since a ground 
that is not moral will indeed now and then produce actions in conformity with the 




But notice that much of what is expressed here is also true of morally wrong actions. Sometimes, 
wrong actions possess what we call moral counterworth. Morally counterworthy actions are wrong 
actions for which agents deserve blame or discredit in virtue of doing the wrong thing. 8 Not all 
actions that violate the moral law possess moral counterworth—that is, agents are not always 
blameworthy for doing the wrong thing.9 Some are coerced, some arise from non-culpable 
ignorance, and some are performed by individuals who lack the capacity to understand the moral 
law or its requirements. In such cases, those who perform actions that violate the moral law are 
not blameworthy for doing wrong and we do not take their actions to reflect poorly on them. 
These actions therefore fail to possess moral counterworth.  
In this way, there is an important symmetry between moral worth and moral counterworth: 
morally counterworthy actions cannot be accidents, just as morally worthy actions cannot be 
accidents. Interestingly, agents can non-accidentally do the wrong thing even if they do not 
deliberately, intentionally, or even knowingly do the wrong thing. Take, for example, wrong actions 
performed out of culpable negligence or ignorance. Wrongs of this kind are not accidental. It is 
no accident that one hits a pedestrian if one knowingly drives around with faulty brakes, nor is it 
an accident that one votes for a dangerous political figure if one never bothers researching the 
candidate.10 The moral wrongness of these actions is a nonaccidental effect of the agents’ lack of 
 
8 While we write mainly in terms of blameworthiness in this paper, we intend to remain neutral between understanding 
moral counterworth in terms of blameworthiness and deserved discredit.  
9 Similarly, not all agents who are blameworthy (or deserving of discredit) have performed a morally counterworthy 
action. On our view, moral counterworth is a term of art that picks out a particular kind of blameworthiness: 
blameworthiness for doing the wrong thing. But agents can be blameworthy for other things as well, like character 
traits, motivations, and beliefs. These forms of blameworthiness are distinct, and likely come with a different set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions than blameworthiness for doing the wrong thing.  
10 It’s noteworthy that non-deliberate wrong actions can be morally counterworthy, since it is typically thought that 
only deliberately performed right actions can be morally worthy. But there is a unifying explanation for this difference. 
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moral concern, just as the rightness of morally worthy actions is “the nonaccidental effect of the 
agent’s concern” (Herman 1981: 366). And given these agents’ motivational profiles, they are very 
likely to perform relevantly similar wrongs in relevantly similar circumstances. Thus, like the moral 
worth of right actions, the moral counterworth of wrong actions is partially dependent on agents’ 
motivations. To assess the moral counterworth of an agent’s action, we need to know why they 
performed it. 
 Given these parallel features of the moral worth of right actions and the moral 
counterworth of wrong actions, reflecting on moral counterworth could shed light on the nature 
of moral worth and allow us to push the debate forward. In fact, judgments about moral 
counterworth may be more reliable than those about moral worth, as Susan Wolf suggests:  
 
To blame someone undeservedly is, in any case, to do him an injustice. Whereas 
to praise someone undeservedly is apt to be just a harmless mistake. For this 
reason, I think, our intuitions about praise are weaker and less developed than our 
intuitions about blame. (1980: 155) 
 
 
Perhaps Wolf’s observation helps explain why neither camp’s praiseworthiness-focused thought 
experiments have succeeded in moving their opposition. In any event, we believe that much can 
be gained by exploring the nature of moral counterworth.  
 
 
When non-deliberate wrongs possess counterworth, as in cases of culpable ignorance or recklessness, it is because 
they are non-accidental—it is no accident that agents do the wrong thing when they are insufficiently attentive to the 
moral reasons to refrain from acting wrongly. But non-deliberate right actions are very often accidents. If an agent is 
insufficiently attentive to the moral reasons to perform a right action, but does so anyway by chance or for some other 
non-moral reason, we would not expect such an agent to act similarly in relevantly similar circumstances. And because 
non-accidentality is of primary importance when theorising about moral worth, we take the symmetry between morally 
worthy and counterworthy actions to hold so long as both kinds of actions must be non-accidental. We explore other 
challenges to the symmetry between moral worth and counterworth in §5.    
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3. Moral Counterworth 
Higher-order and first-order theorists each argue that the motivations their opposition takes to be 
necessary and sufficient for moral worth are actually irrelevant. However, reflection on cases in 
which agents perform blameworthy actions suggests that both higher-order and first-order 
motivations can impact moral counterworth. And because moral counterworth is simply the 
negative analogue of moral worth, this indicates that both kinds of motivations can impact moral 
worth as well, contrary to the claims of first-order and higher-order theorists alike.  
 
3a. Cruel intentions  
Higher-order theorists are committed to higher-order motivations being necessary and sufficient 
for moral worth. In defending this position, they also argue that first-order motivations are 
irrelevant to moral worth. While this claim is defensible (though not beyond reproach) when it 
comes to the moral worth of right actions, it becomes extremely implausible if applied to the moral 
counterworth of wrong actions. Compare two agents who act on the same higher-order 
motivations, but very different first-order motivations, when doing the wrong thing:  
 
Selfish Gossip: Cecile learns of a good friend’s embarrassing secret. She knows 
that it would be wrong to reveal the secret, and does not wish to do wrong. While 
at a party, an opportunity to be the centre of attention arises. Wanting to be 
popular, Cecile succumbs to temptation and reveals her friend’s secret.  
 
Cruel Gossip: Sebastian learns of a good friend’s embarrassing secret. He knows 
that it would be wrong to reveal the secret, and does not wish to do wrong. While 
at a party, an opportunity arises to humiliate his friend by revealing the secret. 
Wanting to embarrass his friend, Sebastian succumbs to temptation and reveals his 
friend’s secret. 
 
In this pair of cases, Cecile and Sebastian possess the same higher-order motivation to stay mum: 
both are motivated to keep their friend’s secret because they know that revealing it is wrong. 
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However, Cecile’s and Sebastian’s higher-order motivations are outweighed by their respective 
first-order motivations to reveal the secret: Cecile’s desire to be the centre of attention, and 
Sebastian’s desire to humiliate his friend. We take it to be uncontroversial that Cecile and Sebastian 
are blameworthy for revealing the secret—their actions each possess moral counterworth. But it 
also seems clear that these agents are not equally blameworthy. Sebastian is (much) more 
blameworthy for revealing the secret than Cecile, and his action possesses more moral 
counterworth than Cecile’s action.  
 What could explain the difference in blameworthiness? Cecile and Sebastian share the same 
higher-order motivation. They also each decide to reveal a friend’s secret, and in so doing become 
the centre of attention and embarrass their friend. The only difference between Cecile and 
Sebastian lies in their first-order motivations. Cecile’s motivation to reveal her friend’s secret is 
morally neutral—a desire to be popular is not in itself morally objectionable. Yet, Cecile behaves 
selfishly when she ignores the moral reasons to keep the secret and acts on the neutral reason to 
be popular. In contrast, Sebastian’s motivation to tell the secret is itself morally objectionable. He 
desires to harm his friend by embarrassing them, which is cruel. We submit that Sebastian’s cruel 
first-order motivation renders him more blameworthy than Cecile. If this is right, then first-order 
motivations are not irrelevant to moral counterworth—for they can directly contribute to the 
degree to which an agent is blameworthy for doing the wrong thing.   
 The idea that agents’ first-order motivations are relevant to blameworthiness has not gone 
unnoticed in the literature. In fact, Arpaly explicitly argues that first-order motivations affect the 
degree to which agents are blameworthy. Arpaly is unique among moral worth theorists in that 
she develops an account of both moral worth and its negative parallel,11 which she takes to be 
synonymous with praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, respectively. She argues:  
 
 
11 Arpaly refers to the negative analogue of moral worth as “negative moral worth” (2002: 224).  
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Other things being equal, a person is more blameworthy for a given wrong if she 
acts out of ill will (from sinister reasons) than she would be if she were to act out 
of a lack of good will (out of neutral reasons, while ignoring moral reasons to the 
contrary). (2003: 80) 12  
 
Notice that Arpaly’s account nicely captures the difference between Cecile and Sebastian in the 
cases above. Cecile reveals her friend’s secret in order to be the centre of attention. The desire for 
popularity is a neutral reason—it doesn’t necessarily conflict with morality (Arpaly 2003: 79). Yet, 
Cecile acts on this reason while discounting the moral reasons to keep the secret, namely the fact 
that sharing the secret will humiliate her friend. Thus, Cecile acts out of a lack of good will towards 
her friend and is blameworthy. However, Sebastian reveals his friend’s secret in order to humiliate 
them, which is a sinister reason and one that is in conflict with morality. This indicates that 
Sebastian acts out of ill will, which renders him (highly) blameworthy, and certainly more 
blameworthy than Cecile. 
 Cases of cruel intentions reveal that first-order motivations can directly affect moral 
counterworth. While the above considerations are compatible with first-order views of moral 
counterworth (particularly Arpaly’s account of the negative parallel to moral worth), further 
reflection on cases of wrong actions raises challenges for these accounts as well.  
 
3b. Evil deeds 
In addition to arguing that first-order motivations are necessary and sufficient for moral worth, 
first-order theorists also contend that higher-order motivations are irrelevant. There is some 
intuitive (though certainly defeasible) support for this claim when it comes to the moral worth of 
 
12 There is a potential asymmetry between Arpaly’s view of moral worth and its negative parallel, since only good will 
impacts moral worth, while ill will and a lack of good will impacts that negative parallel. However, Arpaly and 
Schroeder (2014) provide updated versions of these views according to which both good will and reverse moral 
indifference (a lack of ill will) affect praiseworthiness, just as ill will and moral indifference impact blameworthiness. 
They argue: “a person is praiseworthy for right action A to the extent that A manifests good will (or reverse moral 
indifference) through being rationalized by it” and “a person is blameworthy for a wrong action A to the extent that 
A manifests ill will (or moral indifference) through being rationalized by it” (2014: 170).   
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right actions. But when applied to the moral counterworth of wrong actions, the claim quickly 
loses its appeal. Compare Cecile to an agent who acts on the same first-order motivation, but a 
very different higher-order motivation, when doing the wrong thing:     
 
Selfish Gossip: Cecile learns of a good friend’s embarrassing secret. She knows 
that it would be wrong to reveal the secret, and does not wish to do wrong. While 
at a party, an opportunity to be the centre of attention arises. Wanting to be 
popular, Cecile succumbs to temptation and reveals her friend’s secret.  
 
Evil Gossip: Isabelle learns of a good friend’s embarrassing secret. She knows that 
it would be wrong to reveal the secret, and she wishes to do wrong. While at a 
party, an opportunity to be the centre of attention arises. Wanting both to be 
popular and to do wrong, Isabelle reveals her friend’s secret. 
 
Cecile and Isabelle are similar in many respects. Both agents knowingly perform the wrong action 
of revealing a friend’s secret. The two are also motivated to reveal the secret in order to gain 
popularity. In this way, they possess the same first-order motivation, and act out of a lack of good 
will towards their friend (to use Arpaly’s terminology). Yet despite these similarities, we submit 
that these agents are not equally blameworthy. Isabelle is (much) more blameworthy than Cecile. 
 The relevant difference between Cecile and Isabelle lies in their higher-order motivations. 
Cecile possesses a higher-order motivation not to reveal her friend’s secret—she knows that doing 
so is wrong and does not want to do the wrong thing. However, her first-order motivation to be 
the centre of attention overpowers this higher-order motivation and she chooses to reveal the 
secret. In contrast, Isabelle possesses a higher-order motivation to reveal the secret—she wants to 
reveal the secret because doing so is wrong.13 We submit that Isabelle’s motivation to do wrong 
 
13 Though Isabelle’s motivational profile is admittedly unusual, it is compatible with a fair number of theses about 
motivation. For example, one needn’t reject the guise of the good thesis (Velleman 1992) to make sense of Isabelle’s 
motivational profile. On this thesis, agents are only motivated to perform actions that they take to be good simpliciter. 
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renders her more blameworthy for telling her friend’s secret than Cecile. And if we are right that 
Isabelle’s motivation to do wrong enhances the degree to which she is blameworthy for doing 
wrong, then higher-order motivations are not irrelevant to moral counterworth.14  
 
3c. Dual pertinence  
Above, we argued that first-order and higher-order motivations are both relevant to moral 
counterworth. And moral counterworth is simply the negative analogue of moral worth. This 
provides good reason to think that the kinds of motivations that impact counterworth can impact 
moral worth as well, which leads to the following conclusion:   
 
Dual Pertinence: First-order motivations and higher-order motivations can each 
affect the moral worth of an agent’s action. 
 
Importantly, we do not claim that all higher-order and first-order motivations affect moral worth 
and counterworth. It may very well be that only some subset of these motivations is relevant. 
Similarly, we do not claim that these motivations always affect moral worth and counterworth. It’s 
possible that these motivations impact the moral worth or counterworth of only certain actions 
 
And Isabelle, though she is motivated to do the morally wrong thing, can take doing the morally wrong thing to be 
good simpliciter. Isabelle’s motivational profile could very well conflict with certain versions of motivational judgment 
internalism, however. On these views, there is a necessary connection between judging that something is wrong and 
being motivated (at least to some degree) not to perform that action. Thus, some motivational judgment internalists 
may reject the possibility of an agent like Isabelle. However, it is unlikely that first-order theorists would follow suit. 
In fact, Arpaly (2003: 36-46) explicitly rejects Smith’s (1994) motivational internalist position.  
14 The idea that the motivation to do wrong is normatively relevant has not gone unnoticed in the literature on evil. 
Perrett (2002), for example, argues that in order for an agent to be evil, they must be motivated to engage in 
wrongdoing because it is wrong. And recently, Mason focuses on the motivation to do wrong in her discussion of 
Milton’s Satan. Satan, a fallen angel, purposefully commits himself to a life of evil, averring: “So farewell Hope, and 
with Hope, farewell Fear, Farewell Remorse: all good to me is lost, Evil, be thou my good” (1664, book IV, 109–11). 
According to Mason, Satan is blameworthy precisely because “he pursues evil for its own sake” (2019: 165).  
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and/or that they are only efficacious in particular circumstances.15 We are also not making a claim 
about the degree to which these motivations affect moral worth and counterworth. While it’s 
plausible that some motivations can affect moral worth or counterworth to a greater extent than 
others,16 we remain neutral on this point. We are not, for example, claiming that evil higher-order 
motivations increase moral counterworth more than cruel first-order motivations do, or vice versa. 
Finally, we also remain neutral as to how motivations come to impact the moral worth or 
counterworth of actions. It’s possible that motivations have an additive or subtractive effect on 
moral worth or counterworth, but it could also be the case that these motivations have a 
multiplicative effect. Our claim is simply that both first-order and higher-order motivations can 
affect the moral worth and counterworth of actions. 
 As it stands, higher-order and first-order views of moral worth are incompatible with Dual 
Pertinence, since each view takes only one kind of motivation to be relevant to the moral worth 
of actions. However, there are various ways higher-order and first-order theorists could resist Dual 
Pertinence. Our defence of Dual Pertinence relies on two claims: (I) first-order and higher-order 
motivations can each affect moral counterworth, and (II) moral counterworth and moral worth 
are relevantly similar, such that the kinds of motivations that affect the former can also affect the 
latter. Our defence of (I) relies on what we consider to be the clear intuitive judgment that agents 
who act solely from selfish intentions can be less blameworthy than their cruel and evil 
counterparts. Our defence of (II) rests on the fact that moral counterworth is the negative analogue 
of moral worth, which gives us reason to think that the motivations that affect the former can 
affect the latter. Our opponents could resist (I) by simply denying the intuition that agents who 
 
15 This latter possibility is compatible with Aboodi’s (2017) claim that higher-order motivations are necessary for moral 
worth only in situations that feature “uncertainty concerning underived moral beliefs” (2017: 227).  
16 This leaves room for sympathisers of Williams’s (1981) “one thought too many” criticism, like Sorensen (2004) and 
Isserow (2021), who argue that acting on a higher-order motivation to do the right thing can detract from the moral 
worth of right actions without eliminating their worth.  
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act from selfish intentions can be less blameworthy than their cruel or evil counterparts. 
Alternatively, they could attempt to explain away the intuition by arguing that the fact that the 
purely selfish agent is less blameworthy does not indicate that their action possesses less moral 
counterworth. Additionally, our opponents could resist (II) by attempting to contain the intuition 
to moral counterworth and reject its relevance to moral worth. Although we will not directly 
address the outright denial of the core intuitions that our account rests on, we will address the 
attempts to explain the intuition away and to contain it. As we do so, we appeal to theoretical 
considerations that we believe undermine the blatant denial of the intuition.  
 
4. Evil Deeds vs. Evil Agents 
An agent who performs an action with moral worth is praiseworthy for doing the right thing. But 
agents can be praiseworthy for things beyond performing morally right acts. Indeed, higher-order 
and first-order theorists alike (e.g., Johnson King 2020; Arpaly 2003) distinguish between being 
praiseworthy for possessing certain character traits and being praiseworthy for performing morally 
right actions. In fact, these theorists often rely on this distinction to explain away the intuitive 
appeal of their opponents’ motivating cases. For example, here is how Johnson King accounts for 
the often-discussed case of Huckleberry Finn:  
 
Huckleberry Finn has a praiseworthy character trait: he cares about Jim. And this 
leads him to perform an act of a good type: it is morally right. But it does not 
follow that Huck is praiseworthy for performing an act of this type. And, in fact, 
he is not praiseworthy for performing an act of this type. Huck accidentally does 




Here, Johnson King grants that first-order motivations are relevant to a particular kind of 
praiseworthiness, namely praiseworthiness for character traits, while maintaining that such 
motivations are irrelevant to the kind of praiseworthiness that is related to moral worth.17  
 Likewise, one could distinguish between blameworthiness for character traits and 
blameworthiness for performing wrong actions. Higher-order and first-order theorists could 
respond to our cases of Selfish, Cruel, and Evil Gossip by claiming that Sebastian or Isabelle is 
more blameworthy than Cecile, but not because their actions possess more moral counterworth. 
Rather, Sebastian and/or Isabelle could be more blameworthy than Cecile because they possess 
worse character traits: Sebastian is cruel and Isabelle is evil, while Cecile is merely selfish. If this is 
right, then our cases do not illustrate that higher-order and first-order motivations are both 
relevant to the moral counterworth of actions, and cannot be used to support Dual Pertinence.  
 We agree that there is a valuable distinction to draw between blameworthiness for 
character traits and blameworthiness for performing wrong actions. However, we do not think it 
is plausible that our judgments about the relative blameworthiness of the agents featured in Selfish, 
Cruel, and Evil Gossip track blameworthiness for particular character traits. There is not enough 
information in any of these cases to make a judgment about what kinds of character traits the 
agents possess. And, even if it were stipulated that the agents possessed the same moral track 
records and characters at the moment of their decision to reveal the secret, our judgments about 
their relative blameworthiness would remain the same.  
 Still, one might argue that the agents’ motivations themselves manifest different character 
traits that are better or worse. Or, one could contend that certain motivations make us 
blameworthy all on their own, purely for having them. For example, a higher-order theorist could 
argue that Sebastian is more blameworthy than Cecile not because his action has more moral 
counterworth, but because his cruel first-order motivation expresses a worse character trait or is 
 
17 Johnson King (2019) also argues that both kinds of motivations can themselves be praiseworthy.  
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itself more blameworthy. Similarly, the first-order theorist could argue that Isabelle and Cecile 
perform actions with equal moral counterworth, but Isabelle is more blameworthy because her 
higher-order motivation to do wrong reflects a worse character trait or is itself more blameworthy.  
While such responses are possible, we do not think they are particularly promising. Notice 
that each camp can utilise this strategy to address cases that challenge their respective views. The 
debate would then devolve into a standoff over which motivations manifest character traits, which 
motivations are blameworthy in and of themselves, and which motivations are relevant to the 
moral counterworth of actions. This would be an unfortunate development, since it would make 
for a purely lateral move in the dialectical gridlock. 
 Nevertheless, even if attempting to debunk the blameworthiness judgments about Selfish, 
Cruel, and Evil Gossip doesn’t give either the higher-order or first-order theorist an edge over the 
other, it puts the defender of Dual Pertinence in an uncomfortable position. This kind of 
debunking explanation is very difficult to rule out, so it would be unwise to rely solely on the 
judgments elicited by Selfish, Cruel, and Evil Gossip to defend Dual Pertinence. Luckily, there is 
independent reason to believe Dual Pertinence. In fact, we can derive reasons in support of this 
thesis from both first-order and higher-order theories. Therefore, by these theorists’ own lights, 
they ought to reject the character-based explanation of the Selfish, Cruel, and Evil Gossip cases 
and accept Dual Pertinence. 
 
4a. Quality of will and higher-order motivations  
Interestingly, Arpaly’s first-order account can offer an explanation of how certain higher-order 
motivations can contribute to moral counterworth. Recall that Arpaly analyses moral worth in 
terms of good will, and the negative parallel to moral worth in terms of deficiency of good will 
and the presence of ill will:  
 
If good will—the motive from which praiseworthy actions stem—is 
responsiveness to moral reasons, deficiency in good will is insufficient 
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responsiveness to moral reasons, obliviousness or indifference to morally relevant 
factors, and ill will is responsiveness to sinister reasons—reasons for which it is 
never moral to act, reasons that, in their essence, conflict with morality.  (2003: 79) 
 
Given this characterisation of ill will, certain higher-order motivations would seem to count as 
being responsive to sinister reasons. Take the case of Evil Gossip in which Isabelle reveals her 
friend’s secret because it is wrong to do so. The fact that an action is wrong, while not a wrong-
making feature of the action, is surely a sinister reason to perform it. Such a reason is necessarily 
at odds with morality—an action’s being wrong could never serve as a moral reason to perform 
it.18 So, one could argue that Isabelle’s decision to reveal her friend’s secret because it is the wrong 
thing to do demonstrates ill will, which renders her blameworthy by Arpaly’s own lights.  
 The fact that we can find an explanation for the relevance of higher-order motivations to 
moral counterworth within a first-order account is surely surprising. And, in the sentence that 
follows the passage quoted above, Arpaly argues: 
 
…the person who is deficient in good will acts without regard for the wrong-
making features of his action, while the person who has ill will performs his action 
exactly because of its wrong-making features. (2003: 79) 
 
Here Arpaly equates sinister reasons with wrong-making features. On this characterisation, an 
action’s being wrong could never count as a sinister reason. This is because an action’s being wrong 
is not a wrong-making feature of the action, just as an action’s being right is not a right-making 
 
18 Notice that one can accept this claim even if one also accepts a buck-passing account of wrongness (e.g., Scanlon 
1998), according to which the wrongness of an action isn’t itself a reason to not perform the action. This is because 
an action’s being wrong, while neither a wrong-making feature of the action nor a reason to not perform it, can still 
be the kind of thing that shouldn’t motivate an agent to perform an action. Thanks to Connie Rosati for discussion 
on this point.  
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feature of the action. On this statement of Arpaly’s view, higher-order motivations are once again 
rendered irrelevant to an agent’s quality of will and to the moral counterworth of her actions.  
 What’s gone wrong? How could it be that one characterisation of a view makes room for 
higher-order motivations while the very next sentence renders them irrelevant? Arpaly assumes 
that the only reasons at odds with morality are those that make actions wrong. But as the case of 
Evil Gossip illustrates, this is not correct. The fact that an action is wrong, though it is not a wrong-
making feature of the act, is nevertheless a sinister reason to perform it. Acting on such a reason 
is clearly an expression of ill will. So, given the very machinery of Arpaly’s account, certain higher-
order motivations can be shown to be relevant to the moral counterworth of actions. Thus, reasons 
internal to this first-order view support the claim that both first-order and higher-order 
motivations can each affect moral counterworth. And, given the relevant similarities between 
moral counterworth and moral worth, these same reasons also support Dual Pertinence.  
     
4b. Deliberateness and first-order motivations  
Johnson King’s higher-order account of moral worth also ends up providing reasons to accept 
Dual Pertinence. On Johnson King’s view, an agent performs an act with moral worth if and only 
if she deliberately does the right thing (2020: 202). While Johnson King is clear that deliberately 
doing the right thing need not involve knowledge that one is performing the right action (2020: 
203), she is less clear on what precisely it means to deliberately do right. And while she takes only 
higher-order motivations to be relevant to deliberateness, there is good reason to think that first-
order motivations impact how deliberately an agent acts.19 Johnson King suggests the following 
understanding of deliberate action:  
 
 
19 In fact, Singh specifically criticises Johnson King’s view on the grounds that deliberately doing the right thing 
needn’t involve being motivated to perform an action because it is right (2020: 175). Furthermore, Mason (2019) and 
Singh (2020) can be read as providing accounts of deliberately doing the right thing that rely on higher-order and first-
order motivations.   
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If someone As deliberately, she wants to A and succeeds in A-ing by exercising 
effort and skill; this differentiates A-ing deliberately from A-ing accidentally, with 
mere foresight, or as part of a deviant causal chain. (2020: 203, footnote 9) 
 
On this view, if an agent acts deliberately and non-accidentally, she acts with sufficient effort and 
skill.20 Indeed, as Johnson King notes, this helps ensure the kind of counterfactual success 
characteristic of non-accidentality. However, this approach to deliberateness points exactly in the 
direction of Dual Pertinence. Considerations of counterfactual success, along with considerations 
of effort and skill, appear to bolster the relevance of first-order motivations to an action’s moral 
worth. This is because the extent to which agents are sensitive and responsive to the right-making 
and wrong-making features of actions impacts the effort and skill with which they do the right 
thing.  
 We see this phenomenon in many domains outside morality. Compare a professional 
pâtissier to a novice baker, for instance. Though both wish to produce delicious baked goods, the 
pâtissier puts more effort and skill into their baking than the novice. But what sets the pâtissier 
apart from her novice counterpart? One important difference is that the pâtissier is much more 
sensitive to, and more likely to be motivated by, a wide-range of deliciousness-making features of 
baked goods: texture, complexity of flavour, richness, and so on. A pâtissier could be motivated 
to add cinnamon to her banana bread, for example, because it enhances the complexity of the 
bread’s flavours. In contrast, a novice is not responsive to these first-order deliciousness 
considerations, though she could be motivated to add cinnamon to her banana bread because a 
 
20 While we’ll refrain from objecting to Johnson King’s understanding of deliberateness in this paper, it is worth noting 
that that the link between effort, skill, and deliberateness is not clearly a strong one. We can deliberately do things 
effortlessly, or that we’re demonstrably unskilled at. For example, we can deliberately eat a whole bag of cookies, or 
watch yet another episode of a show, with hardly any effort. And we can deliberately haggle for a better price despite 
clearly lacking the skill to do so. And, if one were to insist that such deliberate acts are skilful or effortful, then we 
may begin to wonder what kinds of actions fail to have these features.  
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recipe calls for it or because an expert has told her to do so. In this case, the pâtissier acts more 
skilfully than the novice, and this is because the pâtissier acts on what may be called “first-order 
deliciousness motivations” while the novice does not.21  
  Acting with effort and skill, be it when doing the right thing or when producing delicious 
baked goods, involves sensitivity and responsiveness to a wider range of properties than Johnson 
King’s account admits. While higher-order motivations may be relevant to deliberateness and non-
accidentality characterized by effort, skill and counterfactual success, so are first-order motivations. 
And because Johnson King analyses moral worth in terms of deliberateness in this sense, by her 
own lights, first-order motivations must also be relevant to the moral worth of actions. Thus, 
reasons internal to this higher-order view support Dual Pertinence. 
 
5. What Does Cruelty Have to Do with Kindness?  
We have argued that because higher-order and first-order motivations can each impact the moral 
counterworth of actions, and because moral counterworth is relevantly similar to moral worth, 
Dual Pertinence is true—both kinds of motivations can impact moral worth as well. But higher-
order and first-order theorists could reject Dual Pertinence by denying that reflections on moral 
counterworth tell us much about the nature of moral worth. They could grant that first-order and 
higher-order motivations are relevant to moral counterworth but maintain that only one kind of 
motivation impacts moral worth. And, since most of those who work on moral worth have not 
 
21 This discussion is related to an objection Howard (2021) raises to Sliwa’s claim that knowledge of an action’s 
rightness is necessary for an action to have moral worth. According to Howard, forms of expertise that are relevantly 
similar to moral worth do not require agents to have knowledge about their own expertise or skilfulness. For example, 
an agent can skilfully play football or write a song without having the belief that one is playing or writing skilfully 
(2021: 307-308).  
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been theorising about moral worth’s negative counterpart, they would have to change nothing 
about their views to accommodate the considerations raised so far.22  
 Furthermore, there is independent theoretical and empirical work to suggest that 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are relevantly different, which could render moral worth 
and moral counterworth importantly asymmetrical (Wolf 1990; Nelkin 2011; Knobe 2003). We 
now explore key ways in which praiseworthiness and blameworthiness come apart, and argue that 
none of these differences can undercut our inference to Dual Pertinence.  
 
5a. Theoretical arguments for asymmetry    
Two prominent defenders of the asymmetry between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are 
Wolf (1990) and Dana Nelkin (2011). Both argue that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary 
to be praiseworthy but it is necessary to be blameworthy. This is surely a significant difference, 
from which one might infer that reflections on the nature of blameworthiness could not shed light 
on the nature of praiseworthiness. If this is right, then the fact that first-order and higher-order 
motivations are relevant to blameworthiness and moral counterworth tells us nothing about the 
kinds of motivations that are relevant to praiseworthiness and moral worth.   
 However, a move from an asymmetry in the ability to do otherwise to the claim that 
reflections on blameworthiness can tell us nothing about praiseworthiness would be hasty. Indeed, 
Wolf and Nelkin come to the view that the ability to do otherwise is unnecessary for 
praiseworthiness but necessary for blameworthiness by defending a much deeper symmetry 
between these two forms of normative evaluation. On their views, what is required (and on 
Nelkin’s view sufficient) to be praiseworthy and blameworthy are one in the same thing—the 
 
22 This is not true of Arpaly. Arpaly defends views of both moral worth and its negative parallel, and argues that only 
first-order motivations are relevant to each. So, to accommodate the considerations raised here, Arpaly would have 
to both argue that moral worth and its negative parallel are relevantly different and revise her account of the negative 
parallel of moral worth to make room for the relevance of higher-order motivations.  
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ability to recognise and act for the right reasons.23 But exercising the ability to recognise and act 
for the right reasons requires different things in different circumstances. When an agent does the 
right thing for the right reasons, she exercises her ability to recognise and act for the right reasons. 
It needn’t be possible for the agent to do otherwise in order for her to act with this ability. In 
contrast, when an agent performs a wrong action, she fails to recognise and act for the right 
reasons. So, in order for the agent to have exercised the ability to recognise and act on the right 
reasons, it really must be possible for her to have done other than she did. This is why the ability 
to do otherwise is necessary for blameworthiness but not for praiseworthiness. It is not because 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness bear no relationship to one another. Rather, these forms 
of normative evaluation require that agents act with precisely the same ability, and this simply calls 
for different things in different circumstances. Thus, one cannot rely on Wolf and Nelkin’s 
asymmetry thesis to support the claim that blameworthiness has little to do with praiseworthiness, 
or that moral counterworth has little to do with moral worth.  
 Still, there might be other important differences between praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness. One noted difference between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness is that 
being blameworthy opens an agent up to being the target of blame, which is characteristically 
sanction-like and harmful (Feinberg 1986; Hieronymi 2004), but this is not the case with praise. 
As Wolf argues:  
 
Acts of moral blame are more connected with punishment than acts of moral 
praise are connected with reward. So… we have stronger reasons for wanting acts 
of blame to be justified. If we blame someone or punish him, we are likely to be 
 
23 According to Wolf, “the freedom necessary for responsibility consists in the ability (or freedom) to do the right 
thing for the right reasons… to choose and to act in accordance with the True and the Good” (1990: 94). And on 
Nelkin’s view, “one is responsible if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons” (2011: 
3). Wolf and Nelkin understand moral responsibility in terms of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.  
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causing him some pain. But if we praise someone or reward him, we will probably 
only add to his pleasures. (1980: 155) 
 
We do not deny this particular asymmetry between blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And 
we grant that this asymmetry should be reflected in how we understand these two forms of 
normative evaluation. For example, perhaps it should be harder, all things considered, to be 
blameworthy than praiseworthy. Or perhaps the limit on the amount of blame agents could 
possibly deserve should be lower than the limit on deserved praise. But Dual Pertinence is entirely 
compatible with these commitments. Dual Pertinence makes no claim about the relative difficulty 
or degree of being blameworthy versus praiseworthy, nor are such claims even suggested by the 
thesis. So, this asymmetry cannot be used to undermine Dual Pertinence. 
 In sum, we can grant these theoretical arguments for an asymmetry between 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness without placing Dual Pertinence in jeopardy. While there 
are surely differences between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, these differences do not 
support the general claim that we don’t stand to learn about the nature of praiseworthiness by 
reflecting on the nature of blameworthiness, nor do they undermine our argument for Dual 
Pertinence.  
 
5b. Empirical work on asymmetry    
In addition to the theoretical arguments discussed above, there is also a growing body of empirical 
work that indicates that there is an asymmetry between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 
Take, for example, Joshua Knobe’s (2003; 2006) work on the Side-Effect Effect, which is the 
tendency to judge that foreseen side effects are brought about intentionally when they are negative 
but not when they are positive. Some have argued that this asymmetry arises because we take 
agents who engage in foreseen but unintended wrongdoing to be blameworthy, but do not take 
 30 
agents who knowingly but unintentionally act rightly to be praiseworthy.24 This explanation 
indicates that the motivations that are relevant to being blameworthy are not the same motivations 
that are relevant to being praiseworthy, which could undermine our argument for Dual Pertinence. 
In fact, Johnson King argues that the research on the Side-Effect Effect indicates that 
deliberateness and higher-order motivations are necessary for praise but not for blame:  
 
[the participants’] reactions highlight an asymmetry between praise and blame: we 
can be blamed for performing an act of a bad type as long as we are aware that our 
act is of that type, but we merit praise for performing an act of a good type only if 
we do so deliberately. (2020: 202) 
 
However, we do not think that the Side-Effect Effect can be used to support a deliberateness 
condition on moral worth or adjudicate between first-order and higher-order views. First, the 
results from studies on the Side-Effect Effect are entirely compatible with first-order accounts of 
moral worth according to which deliberately doing the right thing is not a necessary condition for 
moral worth. To see this, consider the most commonly used cases to illustrate the Side-Effect 
Effect:  
 
Harm: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, 
but it will also harm the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I 
don't care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit 
as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, 
the environment was harmed.  
 
 
24 While we’ll grant this explanation for the sake of argument, it’s important to note that there is considerable 
disagreement about how to account for the Side-Effect Effect, and many of the candidate explanations do not rely 
on an asymmetry between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. See Knobe (2006) and Feltz (2007) for overviews 
of these accounts.  
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Help: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, 
and it will also help the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I 
don't care at all about helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit 
as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, 
the environment was helped. (Knobe 2003: 191) 
 
In the Help vignette, it’s true that the chairman does not act on a higher-order motivation to do 
the right thing when they decide to start the new program. But they are also clearly not acting on 
the reasons that morally justify the action (as Markovits requires) nor are they responsive to the 
features of the action that make it right (as Arpaly requires). After all, they don’t care that the 
program will help the environment; they are only motivated by considerations of profit. 
Consequently, the chairman fails to satisfy the criteria that first-order theorists consider necessary 
for moral worth just as much as they fail to fulfil higher-order necessary conditions.  
 Second, no deep asymmetries between the necessary conditions for praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness arise if one adopts a first-order approach to these cases. On Arpaly’s view, the 
chairman in the Harm vignette is blameworthy because they act out of a lack of good will—they 
act on the neutral reason of profit maximisation while ignoring the moral reasons not to start the 
program. And the chairman in the Help vignette is not praiseworthy for the same reason—they 
act on the profit reason and ignore the moral reason to enact the program. In other words, we can 
explain why the chairman is blameworthy in the Harm vignette and not praiseworthy in the Help 
vignette by examining their first-order motivations alone. Not only does the Side-Effect Effect fail 
to establish any particular necessary conditions for the moral worth of actions, it also doesn’t 
indicate that there is an asymmetry between moral worth and counterworth.    
Moreover, even if the empirical work on the Side-Effect Effect did indicate that particular 
higher-order or first-order motivations are necessary for moral worth but not moral counterworth, 
this would not undermine Dual Pertinence. Dual Pertinence is a claim about the relevance of higher-
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order and first-order motivations to moral worth—and not a claim about the motivations that are 
necessary or sufficient for moral worth. In order to reject Dual Pertinence, one must show that 
only one kind of motivation, either first-order or higher-order, affects moral worth. But the work 
on the Side-Effect Effect does not illustrate this. Whatever asymmetry may be revealed by the 
Side-Effect Effect, it would not threaten Dual Pertinence.  
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we reflected on the nature of moral counterworth with the hope of illuminating the 
nature of moral worth. We argued that because moral counterworth is sensitive to both higher-
order and first-order motivations, this is likely also true of moral worth. So, we proposed Dual 
Pertinence—the view that first-order and higher-order motivations can each affect the moral 
worth of an agent’s action. And while traditional higher-order and first-order views of moral worth 
are unable to accommodate Dual Pertinence, other approaches may be more successful. In fact, 
some have recently offered hybrid views of moral worth that cut across the traditional divide 
between first-order and higher-order accounts. For example, Keshav Singh’s (2020) Guise of 
Moral Reasons Account takes first-order and higher-order motivations to both be required for 
moral worth. And Jessica Isserow (2019; 2020) and Douglas Portmore (forthcoming) defend 
disjunctive views of moral worth, according to which higher-order and first-order motivations can 
each make an action morally worthy without the presence of the other kind of motivation. These 
theorists, without reflecting on the nature of moral counterworth, also come to the conclusion 
that both first-order and higher-order motivations play an important role in determining the moral 
worth of actions.25 Thus, our arguments can serve as a novel source of support for hybrid models 
 
25 For example, Isserow notes that it’s typically thought that wrong actions cannot possess moral worth: “Traditionally, 
only right actions are taken to be candidates for moral worth… Although we may be less blameworthy (if at all) when 
noble motives lead us to act wrongfully, having one’s heart in the right place does not suffice. The road to hell has no 
moral worth, regardless of whether it is paved with good intentions” (2019: 252, footnote 3).  
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of moral worth over the traditional first-order and higher-order approaches. And, given the lack 
of attention paid to moral counterworth, it’s likely that further reflection on morally counterworthy 
actions could shed light on ways to develop and expand these hybrid approaches of moral worth 
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